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JURISDICTION 
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's ruling on a Motion for Award 
of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses denying an award of attorneys' fees and expenses 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
Appellate jurisdiction is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j), 
and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the District Court err in ruling that Provo City did not abandon the 
proceedings when it failed to take any action on this case for more than two years, that 
Provo City did not cause the action to be dismissed because Provo City did not 
voluntarily move to dismiss the action, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, and 
that just compensation in Utah does not encompass reimbursement of expenses, costs, 
and attorneys' fees? 
The standard of review for statutory interpretation is one of correctness. 
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review for correctness, granting 
no deference to the trial court's determinations." Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 911 
P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah App. 1996). See also Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 
658, 661 (Utah 1997); Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1037 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL 
This appeal involves the interpretation of the scope of Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution, and § 78-34-16 of the Utah Code. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Provo City filed its complaint in this matter on June 12, 2002 seeking to condemn 
a portion of the Appellants' property for a road. (Record 35) Provo City subsequently 
filed an amended complaint on September 5, 2002. (Record 209) Appellants, in their 
answers, disputed the right of Provo City to condemn their property, which lies outside 
the boundaries of Provo City in an unincorporated island of Utah County. Provo City 
moved for immediate occupancy and a hearing on the motion went forward on November 
2, 2002 before Judge Anthony Schofield. The trial court granted the City's Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy but stayed enforcement for a period of 20 days to allow the 
Appellants to file a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal. (Record 336) 
Appellants filed their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal (Record 338) and the Utah 
Supreme Court granted permission for interlocutory appeal (Record 343) and stayed the 
proceedings pending the appeal (Record 342). After briefing and argument by the 
parties, the Supreme Court ruled on April 20, 2004, holding that Provo City had not 
established its right to condemn the Appellants' property outside its corporate limits. 
Provo City v. Ivie, 2004 UT 30, 94 P.3d 206. 
While the case was on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, Provo City entered into 
an agreement with Utah County whereby Utah County agreed to condemn the 
Appellants' property to provide for Provo City's road. (Record 395) Pursuant to the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision that Provo City could not condemn the Appellants' 
property, the Appellants made a demand upon Provo City on May 4, 2004 for 
reimbursement of Appellants' expenses and attorney's fees. Provo City failed to respond. 
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Consequently, on May 25, 2004, Appellants filed a Motion for Award of 
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. On September 29, 2004, the Fourth District Court ruled 
that a motion for attorneys' fees was premature because the case had not yet been 
dismissed. 
On June 10, 2004, in accordance with its agreement with Provo City, Utah County 
brought a condemnation proceeding against the Appellants on the same property. On 
September 13, 2004, Judge James Taylor heard Utah County's Motion for Immediate 
Occupancy and granted immediate occupancy to the County for purposes of building the 
road, but again stayed the order for 20 days to allow Appellants to file a Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal. Upon filing that petition, the Utah Court of Appeals granted leave 
to appeal and a stay pending appeal. The matter was briefed and heard by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
On May 26, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that Utah County could condemn 
the Appellants' property for the road. Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 38, 137 P.3d 797. 
Utah County and the Appellants are currently litigating that condemnation proceeding 
before Judge James Taylor as Civil No. 040401797. 
On July 18, 2006, the Appellants filed their Motion to Dismiss the original Provo 
City condemnation case as being moot and for failure to prosecute. (Record 497) From 
November 2002, when the District Court granted the Order of Immediate Occupancy, 
until July 25, 2006, when Provo City filed a Motion to Consolidate (Record 582) in 
response to Appellants' Motion to Dismiss this action, Provo City did nothing to 
prosecute this matter. Provo City failed to file any motions, conduct discovery, make 
requests for action, correspond with Appellants concerning the Provo City condemnation 
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action, or take any action to pursue the matter to conclusion. On October 2, 2006, the 
District Court denied the Motion to Consolidate, and granted the Appellants' Motion to 
Dismiss this case. (Record 743) 
Once the case was dismissed, on December 14, 2006 Appellants filed a Motion for 
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. (Record 781) Provo City opposed the motion 
but did not object to the amount of Appellants attorneys' fees, and only disputed whether 
Appellants are entitled to the attorneys' fees or not. On April 25, 2007, the Fourth 
District Court denied Appellants' motion for attorneys' fees, stating that the statutory 
conditions had not been met. (Record 842) Appellants filed this timely appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 (copy attached as Exhibit "1") provides that a 
condemnee is entitled to reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees in a 
condemnation action if two conditions are fulfilled. The condemning authority must 
have abandoned the proceedings and must have caused the action to be dismissed. In the 
present case Provo City abandoned the proceedings because, after the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that Provo City lacked the authority to condemn Appellants' land, Provo City 
took no action on this case for more than two years, and has not taken any affirmative 
action on the case since the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 2004. Provo City caused the 
action to be dismissed because Provo City utilized delay tactics that ultimately resulted in 
the dismissal of the case. Because Provo City has both abandoned the proceedings and 
caused the action to be dismissed, Appellants are entitled to reimbursement of expenses, 
costs, and attorneys' fees. Furthermore, just compensation under the Utah Constitution is 
broader in scope and in protection of rights than the corresponding protections provided 
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by the Federal Constitution. Just as Colorado and Florida have held, and, as an issue of 
fairness and justice, just compensation in Utah should include the reimbursement of the 
expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending one's property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, PROVO CITY HAS 
ABANDONED THE PROCEEDINGS, AND HAS CAUSED THE 
ACTION TO BE DISMISSED, THEREBY IMPOSING UPON 
THEMSELVES THE DUTY OF REIMBURSING APPELLANTS FOR 
THEIR EXPENSES, COSTS AND ATTORNEYS9 FEES. 
In this case, Appellee Provo City wrongfully sought to take, through eminent domain, 
property outside city borders—property which Provo City did not have the legal authority 
to condemn. Provo City v. Me, 2004 UT 30, 94 P.3d 206. In doing so, Provo City 
forced Appellants to vigorously defend their property. In order to defend against Provo 
City's extraterritorial condemnation, Appellants were required to employ counsel and 
proceed through the judicial process, including appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Provo 
City has imposed on Appellants the necessity of incurring substantial legal costs simply 
in order to protect and maintain their property from the attacks of an illegal condemnation 
action. (Affidavit of Kaye J. Ivie, Record 783, Affidavit of M. Dayle Jeffs, Record 799) 
As was eventually shown by the result in Provo City v. Me, Appellants were justified in 
this vigorous defense. "Every land owner in this country has a right to resist with every 
legal means available the expropriation of his or her land. The right of eminent domain 
does not require docile passivity on the part of a land owner." Utah State Road 
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 834 (Utah 1984). After the Supreme Court's 
decision in Provo City v. Ivie, the present case had no further prospects of success, and 
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Provo City abandoned the action. The case was subsequently dismissed, and Appellants 
moved for attorneys' fees in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
In 1967 the Utah State Legislature addressed the issue of the burdens placed on 
landowners through condemnation actions by amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
The amendment is found in the last half of the section, which reads in pertinent part: 
Condemner, whether a public or private body, may, at any 
time prior to final payment of compensation and damages 
awarded the defendant by the court or jury, abandon the 
proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed without 
prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal 
condemner first compensate condemnee for all damages he 
has sustained and also reimburse him in full for all reasonable 
and necessary expenses actually incurred by condemnee 
because of the filing of the action by condemner, including 
attorney fees. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
As will be explained further below, the facts of this case have revealed substantial 
ambiguities in this statute, which require inquiry into the meaning of the words used and 
the intent of the Legislature when the statute was drafted. The statute lays down two 
requirements for a condemnee to gain entitlement to the costs, expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in defending the action. The condemnor must "abandon the proceedings," and 
must "cause the action to be dismissed." 
A. Provo City abandoned the proceedings. 
Provo City abandoned these proceedings when its defense of the appeal failed and 
when it took no further action in this matter for over two years. Nowhere in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-34-16 is the term 'abandon' defined. "When interpreting statutes, our primary 
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. The first step of statutory 
interpretation is to evaluate the "best evidence" of legislative intent, namely, the plain 
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language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory language we assume the 
legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, t 13, 160 P.3d 1041 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Webster's Dictionary defines abandon as "to renounce and forsake . . . 
to desert as lost or desperate." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 2 
(2d ed. 1978). Black's Law Dictionary defines abandonment as "[t]he surrender, 
relinquishment, disclaimer, or cessation of property or of rights." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 2 (6th ed. 1990). See also Knox County v. Union Livestock Yard, Inc., 59 
S.W.3d 158 (Tenn App. 2001). During a more than two year period following the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling against it, Provo City failed to do anything with regard to this 
case. Despite this inaction, Provo City has taken the position that they have not 
abandoned the case because Utah County is pursuing condemnation of the same land. 
In Provo City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972) (copy attached as 
Exhibit "2"), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether to impose costs and attorneys' 
fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. The present case has striking parallels to 
Cropper, in which the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the same statute 
in very similar circumstances. The statute has remained unchanged since it was enacted 
in 1967. In Cropper, Provo City sought to condemn land owned by Cropper for use as a 
public park. Id. at 629. The action was filed, discovery conducted, and trial set for June 
29, 1971. Id. Five days before the trial, Provo City notified Cropper and the trial court 
that it had elected to not proceed further with the action because of the high appraisal 
value given to the property. Id. The court struck the trial from its calendar. Id. After 
negotiations regarding reimbursement of fees broke down, the trial court conducted a 
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hearing on the matter, dismissed the case and awarded Cropper his costs and attorney's 
fees. Id. Provo City opposed the dismissal (i.e. the dismissal was not voluntary) and the 
award. Id. at 629-30. In analyzing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, the Court stated, 
It would appear that the provisions of the amendment as set 
forth above were intended by the legislature to deal with the 
practice of condemnors initiating proceedings to acquire 
private property for public use and imposing upon the owners 
the burdens of a trial or the preparation for a trial and then 
abandoning the proceedings, when it appeared that the price 
was too high, or for some other reason the condemnor elected 
not to proceed further. Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
Provo City argued that because they had opposed the dismissal of the case, and 
had not acted voluntarily to dismiss the case, that they had not abandoned the 
proceedings nor had they caused the action to be dismissed. Id. Therefore, Provo City 
argued, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 was inapplicable and no attorneys' fees should be 
awarded. Id. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument and chided Provo City, 
stating, 
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff should not be 
permitted to represent to the court that this action was to be 
abandoned and dismissed for purpose of avoiding a trial and 
thereafter to contend that the action is still pending for the 
purpose of avoiding payment of expenses and attorney's fees. 
Id. 
The Court also provided insight into the intent and underlying policy of the statute. "It is 
our view that the statute was designed to correct a problem of unfairness in casting a 
burden upon the owners of private property in this type of proceeding." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
In the present case, as in Cropper, Provo City attempted to resist the dismissal of 
this case and the payment of attorney's fees on the basis that they did not abandon the 
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case and that they did not voluntarily dismiss the case. However, the facts clearly 
indicate that Provo City has abandoned the proceedings. Furthermore, as is made clear 
by Cropper, 'voluntary' dismissal is not required by the statute.1 As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in its Utah County v. Ivie decision, Provo City v. Ivie held "that Provo 
City lacked authority to condemn the property." Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33, ]|4 
note 1, 137 P.3d 797. After this decision, Provo City failed to make any affirmative 
effort to pursue this case. Even before the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Provo City 
v. Ivie, Provo City, recognizing its weak legal position, entered into an Inter-local 
Cooperation Agreement with Utah County, for Utah County to condemn Appellant's 
Property using funds provided by Provo City. Soon after the decision in Provo City v. 
Ivie was handed down, Utah County commenced its own separate condemnation action 
for the same land. Provo City facilitated and funded the condemnation of the property by 
Utah County in that separate proceeding. Appellants have again been required to incur 
substantial expenses to defend against Utah County's condemnation. Conspicuously, 
Provo City was and is not a party to that action. In cooperating with Utah County, and no 
longer pursuing its own case, Provo City ceased all efforts on the Provo City v. Ivie case, 
and abandoned those proceedings. 
As it did in Cropper, Provo City in this case has again tried to avoid its 
responsibility to pay Appellants' the attorneys' fees and expenses by the tactic of not 
dismissing the case of its own volition, but rather allowing the case to languish in limbo 
while Provo City elected to go a different route. The fact that Provo City made no 
attempt to file a Motion to Dismiss, but rather placed the burden on the Appellants to get 
1
 This issue will be explored under a separate sub-heading below. 
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the case dismissed, demonstrates the same kind of tactics for which Provo City was 
chided by the Utah Supreme Court in Cropper. Provo City's attempt to avoid the 
responsibilities is underscored by its attempt to consolidate this case with the Utah 
County case in response to Appellants' Motion to Dismiss. This attempt was 
appropriately denied. In moving to consolidate the cases, Provo City was attempting to 
avoid the responsibilities and unfairness that it visited upon Appellants through its invalid 
condemnation actions in this case—unfairness, which the Cropper Court expressly 
indicated that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 was intended to prevent. 
The ruling by the Utah Supreme Court that Provo City could not condemn is even 
more forceful than an elective abandonment and fits squarely within the "some other 
reason" described by the Court in Cropper. 497 P.2d at 630. Because Provo City has no 
right to condemn Appellants' property, Provo City has "elected not to proceed further" 
the same as in Cropper. The unfairness in this matter is magnified because Provo City 
attempted to condemn property outside it corporate boundaries and which it reasonably 
should have known it had no jurisdiction. In keeping with the declared policy of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, that the statute is designed to prevent unfairness, Provo City 
should be held responsible for Appellants' attorney's fees, expenses and costs caused by 
its improper and failed condemnation action. Any other result would directly contradict 
the statute's purpose, which, as is laid down in Cropper, is to compensate the condemnee 
for the burden imposed by the condemnation action, and unfairness would result. 
Other states, adhering to the same policy of preventing unfairness, have enacted 
similar statutes awarding attorney's fees, expenses and costs in circumstances of 
abandonment. In Platte River Power Authority v. Nelson, the Colorado Court of Appeals, 
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while interpreting Colorado's statute, noted that "a property owner should not be required 
to incur costs when the condemning authority does not proceed properly." 775 P.2d 82, 
83 (Colo. App. 1989). The court went on further to say that condemnation statutes 
should be strictly construed against the government and liberally construed in favor of 
property owners, with the policy against unfairness to the landowners in mind. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court has laid down similar policies in both Cropper and in Bertagnoli v. 
Baker. 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950). The unfairness of imposing upon the property 
owners the costs and fees associated with resisting the expropriation of their property is 
exactly what the Utah State Legislature intended to remedy with the amendment of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
Provo City's unauthorized condemnation action forced the Appellants to incur 
legal expenses, of more than $47,761.50 in successfully defending against Provo City's 
actions.2 The affidavit of the undersigned shows the details of the attorneys' fees which 
have been incurred by the Appellants in defending this suit.3 (Record 799) In addition, 
Appellants incurred expenses of hiring appraisers to begin an analysis of the effect of the 
improper and failed condemnation in the amount of $5,830.00. (Record 783) Said fees 
for appraisers were minimized by stopping the completion of their work when the 
Supreme Court granted the interlocutory appeal. 
The failure of Provo City to do anything affirmative regarding this case (resisting 
the appeal and moving to consolidate were reactionary at best) demonstrates an 
2
 Appellants also seek the fees and expenses incurred in seeking this appeal, in an amount 
to be determined by the trial court. 
3
 It is noteworthy that Provo City has not disputed the amount of attorney's fees, expenses 
or costs, but only whether they are due or not. 
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abandonment of the proceedings. Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term, 
Provo City has clearly 'deserted,' 'forsaken,' 'disclaimed,' 'relinquished,' and abandoned 
its claims in Provo City v. Ivie, the case now before the court. 
B. Provo City caused the action to be dismissed. 
After the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Provo City v. Ivie, 
Provo City failed to take any action on the case for two years, and presumably, if 
Appellants had not made a motion for attorneys' fees, would have been content to let the 
case remain unresolved indefinitely. Provo City, in its motions in the lower court, 
attempted to characterize the requirement of causing the action to be dismissed in terms 
of a voluntary versus an involuntary dismissal. (Record 435) Such an interpretation of 
the statute creates perverse incentives for condemning authorities which is not in keeping 
with the intention or the policy of the statute, and creates an absurd result. 
Under Provo City's reading of the statute, unless a condemning authority 
voluntarily causes the action to be dismissed, the statute does not apply. Under such a 
scenario, a condemning authority would be acting against its own pecuniary interest if, 
after deciding not to pursue a condemnation proceeding, or, as in this case, after being 
unable to legally pursue a condemnation proceeding, the condemning authority moved to 
dismiss its own action. Under Provo City's interpretation, only such a voluntary action, 
in contradiction of the City's own financial interests, would activate the statute and create 
a duty to reimburse the condemnee for their attorney's fees. Of course, with the option of 
doing nothing and avoiding liability, rather than making a legal motion against its 
interests, no condemning authority would ever seek to dismiss its own unsuccessful 
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condemnation proceeding. Such an interpretation is absurd, and contrary to the 
underlying policy against unfairness to landowners, as articulated in Cropper. 
It is an established legal principal that when the result of an interpretation of a 
statute defeats legislative intent and leads to incongruous results, a court is obligated not 
to pursue such an interpretation. Hypertechnical interpretations of statutes which do not 
fulfill their plainly stated purposes are not appropriate. Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 
974 (Utah 1965). "[W]e are cognizant of the fact that we are not following the literal 
wording of the statute, but such is not required when to do so would defeat legislative 
intent and make the statute absurd." Johansen et ux. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 
108 (Utah 1944). See also Robinson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 261 P. 9, 12 (Utah 1927). 
"Allowance should be made for the fact that statutes are not 
necessarily stated in general terms, and that often there is 
neither the prescience to foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of 
language to cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life 
which may arise. For this reason one of the fundamental 
rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it 
was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and 
applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give the 
statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, 
reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically 
applied literalness." 
Andrus, 404 P.2d at 974 (Utah 1965) (internal citations omitted). See also State Land 
Board v. State Department of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1965); Rio 
Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1968). 
"The duty of this court in construing and interpreting 
legislative acts is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. 
In the exposition of a statute the intention of the law-maker 
will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; and its reason 
and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the 
words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the 
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context; from the occasion and necessity of law; from the 
mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to 
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with 
reason and good discretion." "We may then look to the reason 
of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and 
give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, 
sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the 
purpose may not fail. When the intention of the legislature 
can be gathered from the statute, words may be modified, 
altered, or supplied to give to the enactment the force and 
effect which the legislature intended." 
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 97 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1940) (citations omitted). 
Provo City's interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is inconsistent with 
the underlying policy against unfairness, causes absurd results, and at best, is 
hypertechnical and creates perverse incentives for municipalities to never fully conclude 
an unsuccessful condemnation action. By adding a voluntary requirement to the 
language of the statute, Provo City would strip the statute of any practical power. Under 
a 'voluntary' interpretation, no condemnee would ever receive reimbursement of 
attorney's fees after a municipality abandons its case, because no municipality would 
voluntarily seek dismissal. The Utah Legislature, in amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
34-16, could not have intended the statute to have no practical effect. 
Furthermore, Cropper specifically rejects this interpretation. In Cropper after 
Provo City had represented at hearing that they were going to dismiss the case, the City 
subsequently refused to do so. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d at 1-3, 497 P.2d at 629-30. On 
appeal the court noted that "the action was not dismissed voluntarily" and yet the 
Cropper Court applied UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 regardless. Id. at 630. There is no 
voluntary dismissal requirement in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. 
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In its Ruling on this issue, the Fourth District Court held that the statute creates an 
'anomaly/ in which a landowner can receive reimbursement of attorneys' fees if the 
condemning authority decides to voluntarily dismiss the case, or under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 17A-4-11034, the condemning authority offers compensation lower than the amount 
actually awarded at trial, but in no other cases. The District Court recognized the 
perverse incentives created by Provo City's interpretation of the statute, but accepts them 
anyway, holding that the statute countenances this "anomaly and danger." (Record 842) 
However, this result is obtained only if the Court accepts Provo City's illogical 
conclusion that the statute includes a voluntary dismissal requirement. This "anomaly 
and danger" might better be termed unfairness; the exact type of unfairness sought to be 
countered by the statute. Holding that the statute countenances "anomaly and danger" is 
the same as stating that the statute undermines its own policy, to prevent unfairness. 
Such an interpretation is illogical and cannot be reasonably accepted. 
Appellants advocate a more reasonable interpretation of the statute which would 
not insert the word 'voluntary' into the statute, but rather would apply the phrase "cause 
the action to be dismissed" to both voluntary and involuntary causation. In such a 
situation, the condemning authority can cause the proceeding to be dismissed by its own 
action, or as in this case, its own inaction. In the present case, Provo City let this case 
languish for more than two years before Appellants were forced to take some action to 
resolve the issue. Appellants first moved for attorneys' fees directly, but the lower court 
held that the case was not ripe for such a motion and that it must first be dismissed. 
4
 Although UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-4-1103 has since been repealed, the statute was in 
effect at the time this action was filed, and both its provisions and its underlying policy 
considerations apply to this case. 
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Faced with the quandary of inaction on the part of Provo City, Appellants were forced to 
move for dismissal themselves, and the case was subsequently dismissed. Having forced 
Appellants to move for dismissal themselves, Provo City now argues that the language of 
the statute precludes any reimbursement of fees. Such tactics should not be encouraged 
by an incongruous interpretation of the statute. The statute can reasonably be interpreted 
to mean both voluntary and involuntary causation. Such an interpretation is consistent 
with the language of the statute, is in keeping with the underlying policy to prevent 
unfairness, and does not gut the statute of any practical application or power. 
By not taking any action on this case for over two years, Provo City abandoned the 
proceedings, and, through these prolonged delay tactics, thereby forcing Appellants to 
move for dismissal, Provo City caused the action to be dismissed within the meaning of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16. Appellants are therefore entitled to attorneys' fees, 
expenses, and costs. 
II. JUST COMPENSATION, AS USED IN THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE REIMBURSEMENT OF 
EXPENSES, COSTS, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides "Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." While interpreting the 
corresponding clause of the Federal Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated 
that normally, "attorneys' fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation" 
and that "such compensation is a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional 
command." U.S. v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979). However, this same principle 
does not automatically apply to the corresponding state constitutional provisions. 
Colorado's Supreme Court has held that "to require the owner of property involved in 
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condemnation proceedings to carry the burden of costs would not be 'just' within the 
meaning of the constitutional guaranty." Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of Co. 
Corn'rs, 98 P.2d283, 287 (Colo. 1940). Florida has reached a similar conclusion. Dade 
County v. Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950). This Court favorably recognized this 
position in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
App. 1989). In reviewing Florida's approach, this Court held that an interpretation of just 
compensation which includes a reimbursement of attorneys' fees "appeals to a sense of 
fairness." Id. at 1122-23. Because an interpretation of the Utah Constitution was not 
present in Daskalas, this Court was limited to interpretations under the Federal 
Constitution, which clearly do not permit attorneys' fees reimbursement, and therefore 
did not address the issue under the Utah Constitution. 
Although the Federal Constitution does not permit an award of attorneys' fees as 
part of a right to just compensation, similar to both the Colorado and the Florida 
Constitutions, the Utah Constitution can and should. The Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly indicated that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is broader in its 
scope and in the protections it affords. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 
1995). "Indeed, article I, section 22 protects all property protected by its federal 
counterpart, and perhaps even more so due to its more expansive language." Strawberry 
Elec. Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996); See also 
Bagford, 904 P.2d at 1097. 
Furthermore, as outlined above, including attorneys' fees within the rights 
associated with just compensation "appeals to a sense of fairness." Compensation which 
does not place a person in as good a pecuniary position as before the condemnation 
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occurred, and which does not made the person whole, is not 'just.' The Appellants have 
expended a substantial amount of resources in seeking to protect their property from 
expropriation by Provo City, and with regards to Provo City, these efforts have been 
successful. Yet Appellants will have lost these resources and will have been in no way 
made whole, nor will they have been placed in as good a pecuniary position as they were 
before the condemnation was commenced, unless just compensation is interpreted to 
include the costs, expenses, and fees associated with defending ones property from 
attack. Appellants have lost valuable resources, and should be justly compensated. In 
addition, a unilateral loss of pecuniary interest without any compensation cannot be 
termed 'just' unless 'just' is ascribed a technical meaning, disassociated with the ordinary 
meaning of the term, and different from its generally understood meaning at the time the 
Utah Constitution was adopted. Such an interpretation is, at best, strained. Similar to 
Colorado and Florida, just compensation under the Utah Constitution can and should 
include compensation for expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees. 
In addition to the expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees set forth in the affidavits 
submitted to the trial court (Affidavit of Kaye J. Ivie, Record 783, Affidavit of M. Dayle 
Jeffs, Record 799), this court should award Appellants the attorneys' fees incurred in 
bringing this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 provides that a condemnee is entitled to 
reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees in a condemnation action if the 
condemning authority has abandoned the proceedings and has caused the action to be 
dismissed. By failing to take any action on this case for more than two years Provo City 
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abandoned the proceedings. By using delay tactics and by forcing the case into an 
involuntary dismissal, Provo City has caused the action to be dismissed. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-34-16 does not contain a voluntary dismissal requirement, because such a 
requirement would gut the statute of any practical meaning, and because it would 
contradict the statute's underlying policy of preventing unfairness. Finally, regardless of 
the statute, the Utah Constitution is broader in its scope and protections than the Federal 
Constitution. As both Colorado and Florida have done, Utah should interpret just 
compensation to include a right to reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees 
in condemnation cases. 
DATED and SIGNED this ?y -flay of November, 2007. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
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EXHIBIT " 
EMINENT DOMAIN S T S - ^ io 
on notice, and to charge him with duty to in-
quire further to ascertain the facts. U.C.A.1953, 
78-34-15. Salt Lake, G. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied 
Materials Co., 1955, 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 
883. Vendor And Purchaser <^> 229(1) 
Where railway's poles, guy wires and trolley 
wires were located within boundary of land 
deeded to present owner, and a prior deed in 
owner's chain of title reserved part of land 
awarded railway for right of way by decree of 
district court, though such decree had not been 
recorded until after intervening conveyances 
which did not contain such reservation, present 
owner, upon purchase of property, had con-
structive notice of railway's claims and rights in 
land, and was not a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-15. 
Salt Lake G & W Ry. Co v. Allied Materials 
^ ]\..\4- i ft Substitution of bond for deposit paid into coi irt—Abandon-
r.< m u! .uiion by condemner Conditio! is of dismissal 
In the event that no order is entered by the court permitting payment of said 
deposit on account of the just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding 
within thirty (30) days fo11 owing its deposit, the court may, o11 app 1 ication of the 
condemning authority, permit the substitution of a bond in such amount and 
with such sureties as shall be determined and approved by the court. Con-
demner, whether a public or private body, may, at any time prior to final 
payment of compensation and damages awarded the defendant by the court or 
jury, abandon the proceedings and cause the action to be dismissed without 
prejudice, provided, however, that as a condition of dismissal condemner first 
compensate condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also reimburse 
him in full for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by 
condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemner, including attor-
neys fees. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1967, c. 220, § 1. . 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-34 -16. ' 
ie renees 
Eminent Domain <5=>197, 246. C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 357 to 365. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 1 Kskl>7; 
148k246; 
Reseat cl i References 
i • i m i l s 
9A Am Jui-. PI. & Pr. Forms Eminent Domain 
$ ;? :* Sunutorv References. 
497 
Co., 1955, 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P.2d 88* ' 
dor And P u r c h a s e r ^ 229(1) 
3. Sufficiency of evidence 
Evidence in quiet title action brought by pur 
chasers of parcel of land including westerly 
40-foot strip alleged by purchasers to be subject 
to wrongful assertion by State of right adverse 
to purchasers' fee title ownership due to prior 
condemnation judgment was sufficient to sup-
port finding that description of property in re-
corded condemnation judgment did not give 
purchasers, their grantors, or the public notice 
that any of property in conveyance to purchas-
ers was condemned. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-15. 
Ash v. State, 1977, 572 P.2d. 1374.. Quieting 
Title <©=» 44(4) 
EXHIBIT "2" 
REPORT OF CASES 
DECIDED IN THE 
'KJiiYlE COl'K I 
ul< THE STAT.. ; UTAH 
497 P.2d 620 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, Pla in t i f f 
a n (J Appellant, 
v. 
David L. CROPPER et a!., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 12769. 
May 2H, 1972. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, George E. Ballif, J., awarded appraiser 
and attorney's fees to owners of property 
involved in condemnation proceeding which 
was dismissed at condemnor's request and 
condemnor appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Tuckett, J., held that condemnor should not 
be permitted to represent to court that ac-
tion was to be abandoned and dismissed for 
purpose of avoiding trial and thereafter 
to contend that action was still pending for 
purpose of avoiding" payment of expenses 
and attorney's fees but that where parties 
could not agree as to amount to be paid 
28 Utah 2d—1 
owners' attorney for services in connection 
with eminent domain proceeding which was 
dismissed at. request of condemnor, award 
without taking evidence as to reasonable-
ness of fee was improper. 
Remanded. 
1. Estoppel 3^68(2) 
Condemnor should not be permitted to 
represent to court that action was to be 
abandoned and dismissed for purpose of 
avoiding trial and thereafter to contend 
that action was still pending for purpose 
of avoiding payment of expenses and at-
torney's fees. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-16. 
2. E m i n e n t D o m a i n <$=>265(5) 
Where parties could not agree as to 
amount to be paid owners' attorney for 
services in connection with eminent domain 
proceeding which was dismissed at request 
of condemnor, award without taking evi-
dence as to reasonableness of fee was im-
proper. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-16. 
I 
28 UTAH 
Glen J. Ellis, Frovo City 7 H , , fhovo, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
Gary D. Stott, Provo, for defendants 
and respondents. 
TUCKETT, jus t ice : 
The plaintiff commenced these proceed-
ings in eminent domain for the purpose of 
acquiring property belonging to the defend-
ants for a public use in establishing a public 
park. In due course the issues were joined 
and a pretrial was had on June Id, 1971, 
and the case set for trial on June 29. On 
or about June 24, the plaintiff through its 
counsel advised the court and counsel for 
the defendants that because of the high 
value placed upon the land by the real es-
tate appraisers, it was deemed advisable to 
withdraw and dismiss the action. Plaintiff 
also informed the court that the defendants' 
property was no longer needed for a public 
use. Pursuant to the representations of 
the plaintiff, the case was stricken from 
the trial calendar. 
After the case was stricken certain in-
formal conversations were had between 
court and counsel, the record of which is 
not before this court. However, it would 
appear that the conferences were for the 
purpose of discussing the amount of ex-
penses and attorney's fees incurred by the 
defendants in preparation for the trial of 
the case. As a result of the subsequent 
hearing the court made and entered an or-
der dismissing the action without prejudice 
and awarding to the defendants the sum 
. REPORTS 
of $150 for the expense of appraisers and 
$400 attorney's fees. It is from that order 
that the plaintiff has appealed to this court. 
In 1967, the State Legislature amended 
Section 78-34-16, U.C.A.1953, which reads 
in part as follows: 
. • . . Condemnor, whether a public 
or private body, may, at any time prior 
to final payment of compensation and 
damages awarded the defendant by the 
court or jury, abandon the proceedings 
and cause the action to be dismissed with-
out prejudice, provided, however, tha t 
as a condition of dismissal condemnor 
tivst compensate condemnee for all dam-
ages he has sustained and also reimburse 
bun m full for all reasonable and neces-
sary expenses actually incurred by con-
demnee because of the. filing of the ac-
tion by condemnor, including attorneys 
fees. 
It would appear that the provisions of the 
amendment as set forth above were intend-
ed by the legislature to deal with the 
practice of condemnors initiating proceed-
ings to acquire private property for public 
use and imposing upon the owners the 
burdens of a trial or the preparation for 
a trial and then abandoning the proceed-
ings, when it appeared that the price was 
too high, or for some other reason the con-
demnor elected not to proceed further. 
[1] It is the plaintiff's contention here 
that the action was not dismissed volun-
tarily as provided for by Rule 41, I Jtah 
HOLLEY v. 
Cite as 28 
Rules of < m l Procedure, and therefore 
that the action is still pending and the court 
was without authoiity to grant an award 
of expenses and attorney's fees to the 
defendants. We are of the opinion that 
the plaintiff should not be pet mitt t to 
represent to the com t that this action was 
to be abandoned and dismissed for the pur-
pose of avoiding a trial and thereafter to 
contend that the action is still pending for 
the pin pose of avoiding payment of ex-
penses and attoi xj\ \s fees. It is our view 
that the statute was designed to correct a 
problem of unfairness in casting a biudtn 
upon the owners of private property in this 
type of proceeding when the condemnor 
elects not to go ahead with the acquisition, 
and we ate of the opinion that the statute 
is contiolling here. 
[2] The iecord would indicate that the 
parties agreed as to the reasonableness of 
the appraiser's fees but there was a dispute 
as to the reasonableness of the attorney's 
fees. As this court has held, unless the 
parties agree otherwise, the court is obliged 
to take evidence on the issue of the reason 
ableness of the attorney's fees and to make 
findings thereon.1 The record does not dis-
close that evidence was adduced on this 
issue, and we are obliged to lemaml lltr 
case to the district court for a he.uing 
on the amount of attorney's fees to be 
awarded. No costs awarded. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and I IENRIOD, 
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, TT, concur. 
SULLIVAN" 
Utah 2.1 :$ 
497 P.2d 630 
Oarolj i) HfH I FY, P la in t i f f and 
\{v q jo i i i k n t , 
v. 
Samuel H. M i l L I V ^ N , Defendaii l 
and Appellant. 
No. 12G90. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Mav 22, 1972. 
Action was brought by employee to re-
cover wages and moving expenses. The 
Fourth District Couit, Utah County, Jo-
seph E. Nelson, J., found for employee and 
employer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
EUett, J., held that e\idence established 
that employer paid all wages due dis-
chaiged employee within J I bonis after 
employee left employment and that where 
employer discharged employee, who had 
been induced to move from 'Texas to Utah 
to \\<nl, iindf i circumstances obligating 
employer to pay employee's moving ex-
penses, employer could be held liable for 
costs of employee moving back to Texas 
but was not liable for additional costs in-
volved in employee's moving to California. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded 
1, Master and Sci van! * U)\ I) 
Evidence sustained tua l court's find-
ing that former employee had been fired. 
2. Labor Rotations <§^I473 
Under statute authorizing award of 
penalty of up !o oO da\ s' wages to em-
I. F.M.A. Financial (1orp. \. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, KM l\2d t>70. 
